Torts—Libel—Absolute Privilege of Municipal Officials by Kaney, Helen Marie
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 17 Number 2 Article 21 
1-1-1968 
Torts—Libel—Absolute Privilege of Municipal Officials 
Helen Marie Kaney 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Helen M. Kaney, Torts—Libel—Absolute Privilege of Municipal Officials, 17 Buff. L. Rev. 584 (1968). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol17/iss2/21 
This Recent Case is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University 
at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
have been adopted. Nevertheless, it represents a major improvment over the
strict doctrine of contributory negligence.
ARTHUR M. GEL I!AN
TORTS-LIBEL-ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE OF MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS
Plaintiffs, two teachers at Queens College, had repeatedly charged they were
denied promotion because of religious discrimination. The President of Queens
College, defendant Stoke, with the approval of the New York City Board of
Higher Education, issued a press release denying anti-Catholic discrimination
at the college and attributing plaintiffs' inability to obtain promotions to their
lack of suitable qualifications for advancement. Plaintiffs sued for libel alleging
they were defamed by the press release. Defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment based on absolute privilege was denied by the trial court. The appellate
division reversed the ruling on the motion and dismissed the case. The New York
Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting, held, the New York City Board of
Higher Education is an important agency of municipal government with sub-
stantial duties and responsibilities affecting a large number of people, and issu-
ance of the press release was a proper exercise of discretion because of the
widespread publicity which the charges of bias at Queens College had received.
Therefore the Board and President Stoke were entitled to invoke absolute privi-
lege as a complete bar to the suit. Lombardo v. Stoke, 18 N.Y.2d 394, 222 N.E.2d
721, 276 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1966).
The law of defamation recognizes truth and privilege as its two principal
defenses. The establishment of either acts as a complete bar to a suit for libel.'
The defense of privilege is further divisible into absolute privilege2 and qualified
privilege.3 If an individual's statements are absolutely privileged, he is protected
from liability for defamation even though his statements were made maliciously.4
By contrast, if a person possesses only a qualified privilege, the immunity can be
defeated by proof that his statements contain an element of malice.5 Proof of
actual malice requires the plaintiff to show personal spite or ill will, or culpable
recklessness or negligence on the part of defendant. 6 The doctrine of absolute
privilege was first extended by constitutional mandate and judicial decision to the
legislative7 and judicial s branches of government. Executive immunity developed
1. See generally W. Prosser, Torts § 109, at 795 (3d ed. 1964).
2. See, e.g., Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
3. Ashcroft v. Hammond, 197 N.Y. 488, 90 N.E. 1117 (1910).
4. See 1 Fowler Harper & Fleming James Jr., Torts § 5.21, at 420 (1956).
5. For the distinction between absolute privilege and qualified privilege in defamation
see id.
6. Shapiro v. Health Ins. Plan of Greater N.Y., 7 N.Y.2d 56, 61, 163 N.E.2d 333, 336,
194 N.Y.S.2d 509, 513 (1959).
7. U.S. Const. art. I, § 6; for a discussion of absolute privilege in defamation suits
concerning the legislative branch see Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Legislative
and Executive Proceedings, 10 Colum. L. Rev. 131 (1910).
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later and was based on the same general policy considerations as those invoked
for legislative and judicial absolute privilege.9
The origin of absolute privilege for governmental executives was a United
States Supreme Court decision which held that a cabinet officer acting within
the scope of his duty was absolutely privileged in issuing allegedly defamatory
statements.10 Mr. Justice Harlan enunciated the policy reasons underlying the
Court's decision:
In exercising the functions of his office, the head of an Executive De-
partment, keeping within the limits of his authority, should not be
under an apprehension that the motives that control his official conduct
may, at any time, become the subject of inquiry in a civil suit for dam-
ages. It would seriously cripple the proper and effective administration
of public affairs as entrusted to the executive branch of the government,
if he were subjected to any such restraint.1
The subsequent extension of executive immunity to heads of bureaus and divi-
sions of executive departments12 was based on the theory that cabinet officers
must delegate a portion of their work to subordinates,' 3 and therefore the
restriction of absolute privilege to cabinet rank officials only was too limited.
A later development extended absolute privilege to a press release of an internal
communication made by a cabinet ranking official. 14 Further broading of the
doctrine occurred when the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held
that a press release issued directly to the public by a cabinet official was abso-
lutely privileged.' 5 The test of executive immunity was "whether the executive
was within his official preprogative or duty in issuing"'16 the press release.
8. Bradly v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871); for a discussion of absolute
privilege in defamation suits concerning the judicial branch see Veeder, Absolute Immunity in
Defamation: Judicial Proceedings, 9 Colum. L. Rev. 463 (1909).
9. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896).
10. Id. The defendant, Postmaster General, was held absolutely privileged in informing
the plaintiff's clients by letter that the plaintiff was attempting to defraud them. Congress bad
enacted legislation through which certain postmasters were entitled to have their compensation
reviewed and readjusted. Plaintiff claimed he had worked for such legislation and he had
prior to the enactment represented a number of claimants in their demand for a salary
adjustment. After passage of the act, defendant sent checks to the claimants enclosed in a
letter which stated that Congress intenddd all the proceeds of such salary adjustment go
directly to the claimants and therefore no attorney's services were needed to obtain the
money. Plaintiff claimed that this communication induced the claimants to repudiate their
contracts with him and that it injured his name and reputation.
11. Id. at 498.
12. De Arnaud v. Ainsworth, 24 App. D.C. 167 (1904) (A report concerning an applica-
tion for a medal of honor made by the chief of the record and pension office of the War
Department to the Secretary of War, pursuant to department regulations which plaintiff
alleged charged him with fraud.)
13. Id. at 180.
14. Mellon v. Brewer, 18 F.2d 168 (D.C. Cir. 1927) (A letter from the Secretary of
the Treasury to the President was released to the press by the Secretary to counteract
adverse criticism of his department which plaintiff alleged defamed him.)
15. Glass v. Ickes, 117 F.2d 273 (1940) (The Secretary of the Interior issued a press
release stating that the plaintiff, Glass, had been barred from practicing before the Depart-
ment and warning oil operators to be wary of contributing money to finance Glass's one-man
lobby.)
16. Id. at 278.
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The Supreme Court in Barr v. Matteo' was confronted with a case of
defamation in which the defense of absolute privilege was raised by a govern-
mental executive. The majority of the Court approved the prior federal court's
extensions of the doctrine of absolute privilege for executives below cabinet
rank,' 8 and indeed, expanded the doctrine in its own decision. The defendant in
Matteo was the Acting Director of the Office of Rent Stabilization. Both he and
the agency had come under bitter Congressional attack for an agency personnel
practice allowing some agency employees to convert their annual leave into cash.
To defend himself and the agency, the defendant issued the allegedly defamatory
press release explaining the circumstances of the controversial policy and his
role, as well as plaintiffs', in the matter. The Supreme Court, in a five-four
decision, held that since the defendant was Acting Director of an important
agency of government and the press release was within the outer limits of his
duties, it was therefore absolutely privileged. The fact that wide-spread
publicity was given to charges against the agency was cited by the Court as a
further justification for the press release, as was the fact that press releases were
standard agency procedure. 19 The Court in Matteo stated there was a direct
relationship between the availability of the defense of absolute privilege and
the range of the responsibilities and duties entrusted to the official. 20
New York courts have recognized the existence of absolute privilege for
state executives, but initially the doctrine was restricted to official reports and
communications by or to the executive head of a department of government.2-
The "fearless, efficient administration of state government" has been and is the
justification invoked for this rule of executive immunity based on absolute privi-
lege.22 A restrictive application of absolute privilege had been employed in New
York23 until the Supreme Court's decision in Matteo.
24
17. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
18. Id. at 572. "We do not think that the principle announced in Vilas can be properly
restricted to executive officers of cabinet rank, and in fact it never has been so restricted by
lower federal courts."
19. Id. at 574.
20. Id. at 573.
21. Hemmens v. Nelson, 138 N.Y. 517, 34 N.E. 342 (1893) (Defendant was superinten-
dent of a state school for deaf mutes; he allegedly defamed plaintiff, an employee of the school
by reporting to the executive committee that plaintiff had sent an obscene letter to his wife.
The court held that the defendant was only entitled to a qualified privilege because the
courts had refused to extend absolute privilege to subordinate governmental officials.)
22. Id. at 523, 34 N.E. at 344.
23. The courts refused absolute privilege in the following cases: Hemmens v. Nelson,
138 N.Y. 517, 34 N.E. 342 (1893) (superintendent of a state school) ; Andrews v. Gardiner,
224 N.Y. 440, 121 N.E. 341 (1918) (statement of attorney in an application for a pardon);
Hyman v. Press Publ. Co., 199 App. Div. 609, 192 N.Y.S. 47 (1st Dept 1922) (newspaper
printed a list of deserters on request of the War Department) ; Roberts v. Pratt, 174 Misc.
585, 21 N.Y.S.2d 545 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
24. Recently New York courts have been much more willing to grant absolute
privilege. Duffy v. Kipers, 26 A.D.2d 127, 271 N.Y.S.2d 338 (4th Dept. 1966) (town
supervisor); Kurat v. County of Nassau, 47 Misc. 2d 783, 264 N.Y.S.2d 126 (Sup. Ct.
1965) (Commissioner of Accounts' report to the County Executive); Thompson v. Union
Free School District No. 1 of Huntington, 45 Misc. 2d 916, 258 N.Y.S.2d 307 (Sup. Ct.
1965) (school district).
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The Court of Appeals delineated the scope of absolute privilege when it was
denied to a State Commissioner of Conservation who had made allegedly de-
famatory statements in the course of an after-dinner speech.2 5 The court based
its refusal to grant absolute privilege on the fact that defendant's statements
were made outside the scope of his duty. In addition, the court noted that
the defendant had "ready, effective, orderly and legal means of dealing" 26 with
the plaintiff, which he apparently neglected in favor of making statements to an
audience which could do nothing about the situation.
Sheridan v. Crisona extended absolute privilege to certain municipal execu-
tives.27 The defendant, a New York City Borough President, sent a report
to the mayor concerning the city's condemnation of certain real property. The
report was later released to the press. The plaintiff alleged that he was defamed
by the report and sued for libel. The court held that a borough president was
an important official of municipal government because of the substantial re-
sponsibilities entrusted to him in administering the public affairs of more than
a million people,28 and that he had acted within the scope of his duty in sub-
mitting the report to the mayor and subsequently releasing it to the public 2 9
He therefore was entitled to invoke the defense of absolute privilege. The court
noted that the same general considerations of public policy from which state
and federal executive immunity arises also applies to certain municipal execu-
tives.
In the instant case the New York Court of Appeals concluded that its deci-
sion in Crisona was authority for holding the defendants' issuance of this press
release absolutely privileged.30 The court decided, without explanation, that the
members of the Board were within the group of governmental executives entitled
to immunity.8 ' The court noted that the press release was a valid exercise of the
Board's discretionary powers, especially in a time when great emphasis is being
placed on eliminating prejudice and bias in education. The public's right to
know the merits of the charges leveled at the administration of Queens College
was relied on heavily in the court's decision, and the court stated that the
defendants were justified in commenting on the origin as well as the truth of the
accusations.3 2 The court employed the rationale of Matteo as an alternative
test and found the defendants entitled to absolute privilege.
The court recognized the fact that its decision deprives the individual
plaintiffs of their right to defend their reputations in court, but the majority
concluded that the public interest in free communication concerning govern-
mental activities must take precedence in this situation.
33
25. Cheatum v. Wehle, 5 N.Y.2d 585, 159 N.E.2d 166, 186 N.Y.S.2d 606 (1959).
26. Id. at 593, 159 N.E.2d at 171, 186 N.Y.S.2d at 612.
27. 14 N.Y.2d 108, 198 N.E.2d 359, 249 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1964).
28. Id. at 112, 198 N.E.2d at 361, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 163-164.
29. Id. at 113, 198 N.E.2d at 361, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 164.
30. Lombardo v. Stoke, 18 N.Y.2d 394, 399, 222 N.E.2d at 723, 276 N.Y.S.2d 97, 100.
31. Id. at 400, 222 N.E.2d at 724, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
32. Id., 222 N.E.2d at 724, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 101-102.
33. Id., 222 NYE.2d at 724, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 102.
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Judge Scilippi, dissenting, stated that the New York City Board of Higher
Education had a qualified privilege to issue the statement, but not an absolute
privilege. He suggested that Crisona was easily distinguishable on two grounds: 8 '
the Board is not a principal35 agency of municipal government, and the rela-
tionship of the statement to the official duties and responsibilities of the execu-
tive charged is quite different in the two cases.3 6 Judge Scileppi also argued
that Matteo was cited in Crisona merely to add weight to the argument for ex-
tending absolute privilege to a high municipal executive.37 Matteo, however,
does not accurately depict the law in New York State, and its use was not
intended to extend absolute privilege in this state as far as it has been in the
federal courts.
The court's reliance on Crisona as authority for holding that defendants
were absolutely privileged to issue the press release 8 seems misplaced. The
decision in Crisona established immunity from defamation suits for certain
municipal executives.3 9 Crisona recognized a two-fold requirement for applying
the absolute privilege doctrine: whether the office was privileged, and if so,
whether the statement involved was within the scope of the official's duty. The
nature of the office and the duties which the executive must perform were the
criteria employed to ascertain whether the executive was entitled to absolute
privilege. Considering the language of Judge Scileppi's opinion in Crisona,40 it
may be inferred that the court considered a borough president a principal
executive of municipal government. This reading of Crisona is further substan-
tiated by Judge Scileppi's dissenting opinion in the instant case, where he makes
it quite clear that in writing the Crisona opinion, he was restricting absolute
privilege to principal executives of municipal government 4' and not merely to
any important executive of city government. It is submitted that under the
criteria used in Crisona, the New York City Board of Higher Education should
not qualify for absolute privilege. A borough president is the highest executive
34. Judge Scileppi wrote the majority opinion in the Crisona case.
35. Judge Scileppi noted that Crisona only extended absolute privilege to principal ex-
ecutives of municipal government although, in fact, his opinion written for the majority in
that case nowhere mentions principal executives in so many words. Instant case at 402, 276
N.Y.S.2d at 103.
36. The defendant in Crisona submitted a report to the mayor which was intended
to influence governmental action. He subsequently released the report to the press pursuant
to the city charter which permitted the public to inspect such documents. It is submitted
that the defendants in the instant case issued the press release directly to the public without
any view to influencing future governmental action.
37. Instant case at 403, 222 N.E.2d at 726, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 104.
38. Id. at 399, 222 N.E.2d 723, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 100.
39. Sheridan v. Crisona, 14 N.Y.2d 108, 112, 198 N.E.2d 359, 361, 249 N.Y.S.2d 161,
163 (1964). The court stated that "the same general considerations of public policy, which
demand absolute privilege for what is said or written . . ." by state executive officials
applies to certain municipal executives.
40. Id. at 112, 198 N.E.2d at 361, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 163. "Borough President who is
charged with substantial responsibilities, not only in administering the public affairs of more
than a million people (see New York City Charter, 81-83, 196, as in effect in 1958) but
also in performing quasi-legislative functions as a member of the Board of Estimate . . ."
41. Instant case at 402, 222 N.E.2d at 725, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 103.
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official in a borough, directly responsible to the mayor for the administration of
government within his borough. His responsibilities and duties include the whole
range of municipal government. It is possible to analogize his position in the
borough with that of the President in relation to the federal government, the
Governor in relation to New York State and the Mayor in relation to New
York City. A borough president is a policy-making official with wide discre-
tionary powers.
The Board of Higher Education of New York City is certainly an important
agency of municipal government, but its duties are restricted solely to one facet
of the administrative scheme. While it may have weighty responsibilities within
this single area, nevertheless its scope of power is narrow and confined. The
Board's policies directly affect a large number of persons, yet these individuals
are all within a restricted group consisting of those who teach or are students
in a municipal institution of higher learning. Hence, under the criterion an-
nounced in Crisona, the Board of Higher Education should not be considered an
agency which qualifies for absolute privilege.
The court in the instant case held that the press release was within the
scope of defendants' duties. This communication is quite different from that in
Crisona, where the allegedly defamatory statement was made in an internal
governmental report to defendant's superior. This was later released to the press
pursuant to the city charter, which allowed public access to such documents.
Also, in Crisona the original report was issued to the mayor to affect govern-
mental action. In the instant case, the court was confronted by a press release
which was not intended to affect governmental action, but was issued merely for
informational purposes. The public's right to know whether discrimination was
being practiced justified the Board's issuance of the press release according to
the court. While it is clear that free communication between government and
governed in such situations is warranted and in fact essential, it does not
necessarily follow that this press release was within the defendants' line of
duty. In addition, the statement not only emphatically disclaimed discrimina-
tion, but also commented on the professional abilities of those who had made the
charges. This served no educational goals and was not essential to quiet public
concern over the charges of prejudice. It is difficult to ascertain how such
action could be considered within even the outer scope of the duties of the
Board of Education. The court's conclusion that the statement was a valid
exercise of defendants' power does not seem warranted simply because the press
release involved some educational policies.
The Matteo case was cited as persuasive authority by the court in the
instant case. While the federal approach to the doctrine of executive absolute
privilege has not been adopted in New York, Crisona suggests that New York is
approaching 42 the federal rule. The instant case might easily be interpreted as
42. It is submitted that the extension in Crisona of absolute privilege to municipal
executives broadens the application of executive immunity in New York, thereby making
it similar to the federal development.
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an adoption of the federal line of thinking, because it extends absolute privilege
to comparatively minor officials. But reliance on the Matteo case appears ill-
advised due to the great difference in the scope and power of the federal govern-
ment as compared with that of municipal government.
In addition, as Mr. Chief Justice Warren pointed out in a dissenting opinion
in Matteo, the majority did not set clear guidelines as to who will be privileged,
and therefore governmental officials still cannot predict whether their statements
will be absolutely privileged.4 3 He also noted that in Matteo the majority
established a presumption that the challenged action is within the scope of the
officer's duty, thereby shifting the burden of proof to the plaintiff. The instant
case is susceptible to both of these criticisms. The Chief Justice's most telling
criticism of Matteo, which is particularly applicable to the instant case, is that
the wrong interests were balanced by the majority.
This is not a case where the only interest is in plaintiff's obtaining
redress of a wrong. The public interest in limiting libel suits against
officers in order that the public might be adequately informed is
paralleled by another interest of equal importance: that of preserving
the opportunity to criticize the administration of our Government and
the action of its officials without being subjected to unfair-and abso-
lutely privileged-retorts. If it is important to permit government offi-
cials absolute freedom to say anything they wish in the name of public
information, it is at least as important to preserve and foster public
discussion concerning our Government and its operation.44
Finally, the doctrine of executive absolute privilege stands on policy reasons
45
which have never been tested and proven. It is impossible to determine whether
governmental efficiency would be impaired if only a qualified privilege were
granted.46  I
While absolute privilege may be justified in relation to some high ranking
state and federal executives, its application to municipal executives is totally
unwarranted. Government today is progressing further and further away from
sovereign immunity, yet absolute privilege runs completely counter to this
trend.
HELEN MARIE KANEY
43. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 578 (1958).
44. Id. at 584-585.
45. See text accompanying supra note 8.
46. See Mr. Justice Brennan's dissent in Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 589-590 (1958).
